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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being

charged

with felony

possession

of a controlled

substance,

methamphetamine, Arnold Dean Anderson exercised his constitutional right to a jury
trial. He was found guilty of that charge, as well as a persistent violator enhancement,
and received a sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed.
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied him his right to
self-representation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
Article I, § ·13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code §§ 19-·106 and 19-857.
Mr. Anderson also asserts that his right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the district court summarily denied his request for
substitute counsel without providing Mr. Anderson a full and fair opportunity to explain
the conflict he had with his counsel, and it further erred in denying the motion.
Furthermore, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case.
Mr. Anderson is filing this Reply Brief to address the State's contentions
regarding Mr. Anderson's problems with his counsel and the preservation of such
claims.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Anderson's rights under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho
Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, when it ignored his request to be heard regarding
his desire to represent himself at trial?

2.

Did the district court err when it failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry of
Mr. Anderson and his trial counsel upon Mr. Anderson's request for substitute
counsel, and when it failed to appoint substitute counsel for Mr. Anderson?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
upon Mr. Anderson in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case? 1

Mr. Anderson will not further address the sentencing issue as the issue was fully
developed and argued in his Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.)
1
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ARGUMENT

L
The District Court Violated Mr. Anderson's Rights Under The Sixth Amendment To The
United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution, And Idaho
Code§§ 19-106 And 19-857 When It I 1nored His Request To Be Heard Regarding His
Desire To Represent Himself At Trial
Mr. Anderson first attempted to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to
self-representation at a hearing held approximately one month before trial.

At that

hearing, Mr. Anderson's counsel advised the district court that Mr. Anderson wanted to
be heard on a motion to proceed prose.

(10/21/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.) Upon being

informed by defense counsel of Mr. Anderson's request, the district court noted that it
had not heard anything from Mr. Anderson about his concerns or his desire to represent
himself. (10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-15.) The district court told the parties that it would set
the matter for a hearing on Friday, during which time the court would hear
Mr. Anderson's motion to represent himself.

(10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20.) However,

the hearing was vacated without explanation. (R., pp.4-5, 97.) The district court did not
provide any reasoning or basis for depriving Mr. Anderson of his right to selfrepresentation.
Mr. Anderson asserts that his right to self-representation, under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution,
and Idaho Code §§ 19-106 and 19-857, was violated when the district court essentially
ignored his requests to proceed pro se. The violation of his right to self-representation
requires that his conviction be set aside, and this matter remanded for a new trial at
which his right to self-representation is honored.
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The State claims that Mr. Anderson "misrepresented" the record by arguing that
the district court should have inquired of him at the October 21, 2013, hearing regarding
his desire to proceed prose. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) However, Mr. Anderson did not
assert that the district court should have inquired of him at the October 21, 2013
hearing, Mr. Anderson merely pointed out that the district court did not inquire of him on
this date. The State is mischaracterizing Mr. Anderson's issue(s) on appeal.
On appeal, Mr. Anderson is claiming that the district court's failure to hold the
hearing served as an implicit denial of the motion, not its failure to inquire of

Mr. Anderson on October 21, 2013. 2 While it is true that the district couti did not direct
any questions to Mr. Anderson on October 21, 2013--it could have inquired of

Mr. Anderson by having him brought up from the jail or had him appear telephonically
from the Twin Falls County Jail-such was not the issue on appeal. Mr. Anderson's
claim set forth in the Appellant's Brief was that the district court promised his counsel it
would set a hearing, then set a hearing, but later essentially denied the request by
vacating the promised hearing. Thus Mr. Anderson was never heard on his motion to
proceed prose where the district court implicitly denied the motion.
It was not through any failure or neglect by Mr. Anderson that he was not brought
up for the hearing; however, he did manage to communicate through his counsel his
desire to represent himself. (10/21/13 Tr., p.4, L.20 - p.5, L.2.) When Mr. Anderson's

2

In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Anderson stated, "the district court did not direct any
questions to Mr. Anderson." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Perhaps this would have been
more accurately stated as, "did not have Mr. Anderson brought up from the jail in order
to inquire of Mr. Anderson." The Twin Falls County Jail, where Mr. Anderson was being
held at the time of the hearing on October 21, 2013, is located in the same complex as
the Twin Falls County Courthouse.
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counsel told the district court that Mr. Anderson wanted to be heard on his wish to
appear pro se, the district court acknowledged the issue, and told Mr. Anderson's
counsel that it would set a hearing for that Friday, October 25, 2013. (10/21/13 Tr., p.5,
Ls.11-21.) Although the district court told Mr. Anderson's counsel the date and time of
the hearing and set a hearing for that day, it then implicitly denied the motion by
vacating and not resetting the hearing.

(10/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-15; R., pp.4-5, 9.)

Thereby, the district court denied Mr. Anderson an opportunity to be heard on his
motion.
Further, the State apparently is claiming that Mr. Anderson could not validly seek
to represent himself pro se by asking his counsel to make the district court aware of
Mr. Anderson's wishes. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7.) Such a claim is not supported by
law-appointed defense counsel has the power to speak on the behalf of the defendant.
It is nonsensical for the State to claim that Mr. Anderson must be present in person in
order to validly request a hearing be set on his motion to proceed prose.
Whether Mr. Anderson was present in person to ask for the hearing or whether
he asked his attorney to request the hearing is not determinative of the issue.
Mr. Anderson's counsel spoke for him at all hearings such that Mr. Anderson was not
brought from the jail into the courtroom as his counsel stood in his stead.

"If in any

case, civil of criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by
counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that
such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the
constitutional sense." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). The State's apparent
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assertion that a defendant must personally appear in order to voice his desire to
proceed pro se is unsupported by the law.
To follow the State's argument to its logical conclusion would require this Court to
ignore decades of established precedent holding that a defendant's counsel can speak
for the defendant. If such is true, a defendant would need to be transported to every
hearing in his case, no matter how minor, as his wishes could not be communicated
through counsel, and could in fact be disregarded, if he were not physically present.
Here, the district court heard from Mr. Anderson's counsel that Mr. Anderson
wanted to be heard on his desire to proceed pro se. At that time, the district court did
not attempt to inquire of Mr. Anderson by having Mr. Anderson telephoned or brought
over from the jail. The district court communicated to Mr. Anderson's counsel that it
would set a hearing, at which time it would hear Mr. Anderson's motion. The hearing
was set, but vacated.

Although the State is asking this Court to "infer[ ] [ ] that the

district court elected to hear the concerns raised at the October 21, 2013 hearing at the
already scheduled October 28 pre-trial conference rather than on October 25" such
supposition is purely speculative, and not based on information in the record or
contained in the October 28, 2013 hearing transcript. (Respondent's Brief, p.2, n.3;

see

10/28/13 Tr., p.3, L.1 - p.10, L.10 (absence of explanation as to why the October 25th
hearing was vacated and absence of questions regarding Mr. Anderson's desire to
proceed pro se).) Thus, Mr. Anderson was effectively denied his request to represent
himself without a hearing.
Further, the fact that Mr. Anderson did not subsequently renew his motion to
represent himself at the previously scheduled pre-trial conference the following Monday,
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October 28, 2013, did not cure the error. Mr. Anderson was not required to repeatedly
renew his request as he had already been granted a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.4-5,
9.) The request had been implicitly denied by the district court, as no hearing was held
and the hearing date was vacated.

At that point, Mr. Anderson rightly must have

concluded that he could not represent himself and thus began the process to hire
different counsel. See State v. Hoppe, 139 Idaho 871 (2003) (holding that defendant
was not required to renew his request and was not prohibited from hiring counsel where
district court previously placed stringent test on defendant's ability to proceed pro se).
Further, like the defendant in Hoppe, Mr. Anderson did not want court-appointed
counsel and he had the constitutional right to reject such assistance.

"A request to

retain counsel of one's choice is not inconsistent with a desire to reject court-appointed
counsel." Id. at 876. Further, the district court did not advise Mr. Anderson at any point
during the October 28, 2013, hearing that it would consider a motion to proceed pro se
at that time.
The district court's failure to address Mr. Anderson's request to proceed prose
was erroneous.
For the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Anderson asserts he was not given the
meaningful opportunity to be heard required under both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions before his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was impliedly
denied by the district court. His case must therefore be remanded for a new trial.
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11.
The District Court Erred When It Failed to Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Anderson
And His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Anderson's Request For Substitute Counsel Thereby
Depriving Him Of His Right To Counsel Protected By The Sixth And Fourteenth
Amendments Of The United States Constitution As Well As Article I,§ 13 Of The Idaho
Constitution
The State claims that "the Supreme Court of the United States has not required
inquiry into conflicts outside the context of 'multiple concurrent representation."'
(Respondent's

p.8.) However, in State v. Bias, the Idaho Supreme Court recently
the duty to inquire and found it was fact-dependent.

Bias, 157 Idaho

_, 341 P.3d 1

, 267 (2014)

State v.

that the district

erred by ruling on the motion for substitute counsel before gathering the facts required
to adjudicate the motion). The Bias Court found that in those cases where the record is
insufficient to determine if substitute

is required, the district court has a duty to

investigate to formulate a proper basis for a ruling. Id.
The Sixth Amendment has been construed to ensure that a defendant receives
conflict-free counsel in state criminal proceedings. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271
(1981 ). The Idaho Supreme Court noted, "[i]n order to ensure that a defendant receives
conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential
conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may
exist."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 703 (2009). Further, "a trial court's examination
of the potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on
the record." Id. at 704.
Here, although Mr. Anderson filed a memorandum in support of his motion for
new counsel, the district court did not reference the information contained therein when
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speaking to the parties. (3/28/14 Tr., p.4, L.5 -- p.13, L.8.) After Mr. l'Jelson advised the
district court that Mr. Anderson clearly did not want Mr. Nelson to represent him, and
that Mr. Anderson wanted to represent himself, the district court inquired of
Mr. Anderson. (3/28/14 Tr., p.6, L.14

p.7, L.3.) After Mr. Anderson told the district

court that he had originally wanted to represent himself, the court stopped him, and
limited Mr. Anderson in his response to what remedy Mr. Anderson wanted-to
represent himself, to hire another attorney, or to ask for public defender representation.
(3/28/14 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.11, 7.) The district court then asked Mr. Anderson's attorney,
Doug Nelson, whether he was prepared to advocate for an appropriate sentence for
Mr. Anderson. (3/28/14 Tr., p:11, L.22

p.12, L.1.) The district court did not delve into

the problems Mr. Anderson had been having with his counsel before it denied
Mr. Anderson the opportunity to address the conflict any further. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 7, L.4 -p.13, L.8.) This failure to provide Mr. Anderson with a full and fair opportunity to present
the facts in support of his request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right to
counsel protected by both the federal and Idaho Constitutions. As such, Mr. Anderson's
case must be remanded to the district court in order for the court to conduct the
constitutionally mandated inquiry in order to determine whether substitute counsel
should be appointed and for any further proceedings that may be necessary as a result
of the trial court's determination.
The district court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry of Mr. Anderson and his
trial counsel upon Mr. Anderson's request for appointment of substitute counsel. The
district court did not ask Mr. Anderson to address the problems he had been having with
his counsel and which he had identified in his motion to dismiss. This failure to provide
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Mr. Anderson with a full and fair opportunity to present the facts in support of his
request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right to counsel protected by both the
federal and Idaho Constitutions.
Further, had the district court held an adequate inquiry, sufficient evidence
existed such that the court would have found cause to appoint substitute counsel.
As the State correctly notes, I.C. § 19-856 was repealed by the Idaho
Legislature, effective July 1, 2013; however, the statute was repealed as part of an
effort to "achieve uniformity in the provision of counsel at public expense," and over a
dozen statutes were affected by the bill. I.C. § 19-856, repealed by S.L. 2013, ch. 220 §
6, effective July 1, 2013.
Simply because the Idaho Legislature repealed the statute specifying the
standard to be employed by the district court in deciding to appoint substitute counsel
does not mean that the standard regarding the appointment of substitute counsel was
abrogated entirely.

The Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have

held that a trial court is required

to apply certain procedures when a defendant seeks

substitute counsel. The Idaho appellate courts have held that trial courts have a "duty
to inquire" and an "obligation 'to afford [the] defendant a full and fair opportunity to
present the facts and reasons in support of his motion for substitution of counsel' " that
is constitutionally required. Bias, 341 P.3d at 1266-67. Once a sufficient inquiry has
been made, the district court must then decide if the facts and evidence necessitate
appointment of substitute counsel. "Upon a showing of good cause, a trial court may
appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant." State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712,

11

714-15 (2002). 3

Such a determination is evaluated using an abuse of discretion

standard. Id. at 715; State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980).
In Clayton, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on both the recently repealed
I.C. § 19-856 as well as State v. Ames, 563 P.2d 1034 (Kan. 1977) and State v.

Salazar, 469 P.2d 157 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970) in support of this standard. Id. at 897. In
State v. Lippert, the Court of Appeals held that that case should be remanded in order
for the district court to conduct a hearing into the defendant's complaints. Lippert, 145
Idaho 586, 596 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court of Appeals held that the district court must
conduct an inquiry to determine whether the defendant possessed good cause for his
request for substitute counsel. Id. "Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a
complete, irrevocable breakdown of communications; or an irreconcilable conflict which
leads to an apparently unjust verdict."

Id. (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,

1320 (8 th Cir. 1991); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927,931 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.

Lott, 310 F.3d 12331, 1250 (10 th Cir. 2002) (setting forth constitutional implications of a
total breakdown in communication); State v. Torres, 93 P.3d 1056, 1060-61 (Ariz.
2004); State v. Carmen, 114 Idaho 791, 793 (Ct. App. 1988)).

In making this

determination:
[T]he court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of
the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound
discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her

Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. Even when
the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous
and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.

Notable, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Nath does not cite or refer to I.C. § 19856 for this conclusion.
3
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Id. at 596 (quoting State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).

In addition, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying the request for substitute
counsel where the denial of the motion results in a violation of the defendant's right to
adequate representation of counsel.

Nath, 137 Idaho at 715.

defendant establishes that appointed counsel

Therefore, where the

is not fulfilling the constitutional

obligations of counsel to which the defendant is entitled, it is an abuse of discretion to
deny a request for substitute counsel. Thus Idaho law is not grounded entirely in the
language of the statute, but flows from well-established precedent as well.
Here, Mr. Anderson filed a written motion to dismiss his counsel for being
ineffective. (R., pp.277-281.) Some of the concerns outlined in the Motion to Dismiss
Counsel included the fact that trial counsel did not accept phone calls from
Mr. Anderson and failed to interview witnesses identified by Mr. Anderson. (R., pp.277281.) Mr. Anderson also claimed that his counsel failed to subpoena records which
would have impeached the testimony of one of the State's witnesses. (R., pp.278-279.)
Yet, the district court denied both Mr. Anderson's Motion to Dismiss Counsel as well as
Mr. Anderson's counsel's Motion to Withdraw and proceeded to sentence Mr. Anderson.
(3/28/14 Tr., p.12, L.2- p.13, L.8.)
The district court provided the following as its reasoning for denying the two
motions:
THE COURT: Here are the reasons that I am making this decision: We
are here today to do one very simple thing - very simple in terms of at
least procedure - Mr. Hatch is going to tell me what the state wants in
terms of a sentence in this case. We have the record. Nobody has
indicated there's any reason to offer evidence for further investigation or
anything else. The defense is going to tell me what their position is and
what their recommendations are and then I'm going to make a decision as
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to what sentence to impose in this case. I see no purpose to be served
whatsoever by further delaying this case.
The second reason that I am denying both of these motions at this time is
that I am making a very specific finding, Mr. Anderson, that you are
continuing to abuse the public defender system of this county, you are
playing games with this court. The history in Case Number 154 and all of
the things that you just talked about with Mr. Anderson are perfectly
illustrative of the fact that you asked for public defender representation
and then you get into a conflict with them of your own creation, and then
you come in and complain to this court about that, you complain about
your attorneys, and you're doing the same thing today. I find this is an
unacceptable delay in these proceedings. It's time to get this case
resolved, let you go through the appellate process and the post-conviction
process. And that's why I'm denying these motions.
(3/28/14 Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.6.)

Rather than recognizing the issues set forth in

Mr. Anderson's memorandum as impacting his constitutionally guaranteed right to the
effective assistance of counsel, the district court merely dismissed his claims on two
bases - both of which were in error. Instead of inquiring further and also questioning
appointed counsel about the specific allegations by Mr. Anderson, the district court
merely asked counsel if he was prepared to advocate for Mr. Anderson at the
sentencing hearing that day.

Essentially, the district court denied to the motions to

prevent further delay of the case.

Like the Courts in Lippert and Bias, this Court is

therefore unable to determine whether Mr. Anderson's complaints were valid.
Because the district court's consideration of the delay that would be the result of
assigning new counsel was not the proper legal standard and because the district court
failed to consider the bases for Mr. Anderson's motion, the court's denial of
Mr. Anderson's request for substitute counsel was error. Accordingly, he asks that this
Court vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence and the order denying his motion
to dismiss his counsel, and remand this case for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this
Court vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a new trial at which his right to
self-representation is honored. In the alternative, Mr. Anderson requests that his case
be remanded to the district court in order for the court to conduct the constitutionally
mandated hearing to determine whether good cause exists for the appointment of
substitute counsel and for any further proceedings that may be necessary as a result of
the trial court's determination.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court

reduce his sentence or vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 2·1 st day of April, 2015.

SALL YlJ. COOLEY
.
Deputy State AppellaN:f/Public Defender
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